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    t is a bit daunting to think about the “road ahead” when the concept of 
cyber warfare is just entering the public discourse. Fueled first by cyber “at-
tacks” in Estonia and then in Georgia,1 the dialogue has gotten louder with 
revelations about a cyber conflict occurring as part of the “covert” cam-
paign to disrupt the nuclear program of Iran.2 Terms such as “Stuxnet,” 
“Duqu” and “Flame” have now entered the public cyber lexicon.3 How 
international law should regulate the use of this technologically advanced 
domain with regard to the recourse to war (the jus ad bellum), and as method 
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and means of warfare (the jus in bello) has become the subject of substantial 
legal scrutiny.4 
The contemporary discussion of cyber threats speaks not only of dan-
ger, but often also of catastrophe. In this regard it is not uncommon to 
hear of cyber “Pearl Harbors”5 and for cyber “weapons” to be equated to 
implements of mass destruction based on what has been termed a “micro-
force,” similar to chemical and biological armaments.6 In addition, it has 
been suggested that “[t]he conventions and applicable case law on nuclear 
warfare are relevant to controlling the scope and tools of [information war-
fare].”7 The use of the term “information warfare” reflects an almost 
schizophrenic discussion that includes soft concepts like preserving or ex-
ploiting information, and bellicose words, such as attacks.8  
As a microforce, cyber presents a significant communication challenge 
for anyone attempting to explain how it works and why anyone should be 
worried about its capabilities. It is difficult to suggest that cyber is a threat 
of exceptional proportions when cyber means are trending in the opposite 
direction with ever shrinking hardware. Explanations of the cyber domain 
often result in a dialogue wrapped in a mysterious language of “clouds,” 
“viruses” and “botnets.” Reflecting its nascent status in terms of regulation, 
the language of cyber incorporates a breathtaking range of seemingly un-
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connected concepts that appear more closely aligned to advertising, science 
fiction and biological threats, although it can also take on a more bellicose 
connotation in its reference to attacks. This language can be problematic 
for those seeking to come to grips with the domain and, importantly, 
communicate its dangers within governments and to the broader public.  
At times, there can be an overriding sense that the public is only now 
learning what States are being forced to reveal.9 Cyber is a creature of tech-
nological advancement. As often occurs, the technology has developed well 
ahead of the limiting framework States use to keep its advances in check. 
In this regard, the road ahead appears to be one with two merging lanes. 
One path is a technological, with advances occurring at apparently prodi-
gious speed. Such developments are limited, it would seem, only by the im-
agination of their creators. The other lane is one where the policy, ethical 
and ultimately legal constraints of society are being test driven even as they 
are being developed. In a sense this is a phenomenon that has been seen 
before as society struggled to control the development of chemical and nu-
clear weapons and air warfare following World Wars I and II.  
However, there is a fundamental difference in the twenty-first century. 
At no point were the twentieth century weapons readily available to the 
world’s population. It was estimated in 2008 there were one billion person-
al computer users worldwide, a figure expected to double by 2014.10 
Among those users are teenagers keen on social networking or testing their 
ability to challenge the rules imposed on them by society. It is a world that 
also includes hacktivists, like the group Anonymous, whose penetration of 
government, business and organizational websites raises security concerns, 
but is not readily associated with legal concepts such as armed attack and 
armed conflict.11  
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The “information superhighway” that forms the backbone of the cyber 
domain is truly a crowded thoroughfare.12 What is not known at this stage 
is whether the intersection of the two lanes along this cyber road stretching 
into the future will be the scene of a tremendous clash of cultures (one 
technological and the other societal) or a seamless integration that restricts 
cyber as a means of warfare to help meet the security needs of States, while 
being constrained by humanitarian demands in its application. 
One can be skeptical regarding the accuracy of the forecasts of cyber 
Armageddon with the advent of cyber warfare. Although it has largely now 
disappeared from the contemporary cyber dialogue, in 1999 there were 
predictions by the technical community of a potential “catastrophe.” How-
ever, this one was in the nature of a self-inflicted wound. Apparently, in the 
early days of computer development: 
 
[P]rogrammers sought to economise on then-scarce computer storage 
space by writing dates with two digits for the year instead of four. These 
programmers either failed to consider the implications of the end of the 
20th century or assumed that their systems would have been scrapped 
long before then. By the time the problem was taken seriously in the mid-
1990s, code with two-digit dates was said to be ubiquitous, occurring not 
only in conventional computer systems but in ‘embedded systems’ such 
as those in automatic lifts, air navigation systems and so on. While the ex-
act consequences of these problems were beyond anyone’s imagination, 
widespread system failures could be anticipated on 1 January 2000, and 
the cascading effect of these failures was expected to cause, at a mini-
mum, severe economic dislocation.13 
 
The Y2K concern is of particular relevance to twenty-first century dis-
cussions about cyber warfare. It involved the resilience of the machines 
and systems, such as the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
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networks controlling electrical grids and pipelines,14 and the impact of a 
critical failure of these machines that govern everyday life and harness the 
dangerous forces upon which modern civilized society is based.15  
The result was a mobilization of large parts of the developed world to 
prepare for the turn of the century. In November 1999, it was estimated 
expenditures “by U.S. firms, non-profits and government agencies, in the 
years 1995 through 2001, will be in the neighborhood of $100 billion, or 
about $365 per U.S. resident.”16 Apparently the response was not uniform, 
as Europe and other parts of the world either reacted unenthusiastically or 
not at all.17  In contrast, English-speaking countries paid particular atten-
tion to the perceived threat, not only because of their common language 
and historical ties, but also, it is suggested, as a result of reliance to various 
degrees on tort litigation as a means of social regulation.18  
The rest is history, as uneventful as it was. The predictions proved very 
wrong. Perhaps the best summary is that provided by John Quiggan, who 
noted with regard to the Y2K “disaster” that “[f]rom the perspective of 
public administration, the two most compelling observations relate to con-
formity and collective amnesia.”19 Once a conformist response has been 
initiated, “no policy actors have any incentive to oppose, or even to critical-
ly assess, the dominant view.”20 Developed countries had become depend-
ent upon new technology that apparently was not fully understood. This 
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led to a perceived crisis. The Y2K incident suggests, perhaps, that with re-
gard to claims regarding the impact of cyber warfare it would be prudent 
for legal advisors to have a degree of skepticism in assessing predictions of 
disaster. 
Much has changed, however, since Y2K. Cyber is even more integrated 
into society. As a security issue, it is here to stay and appears to be capable 
of more than simple interference with our lives. Indeed, in addition to be-
ing integrated into our everyday life, cyber is also part of the national order 
of battle for over thirty countries.21 It is assessed that at least twelve of the 
world’s fifteen largest militaries are building cyber warfare programs.”22 For 
the United States, this means cyberspace is an operating domain on par 
with land, sea, air and space,23 as well as one requiring dedicated command 
and units.24 It is likely that the involvement of other countries in the mili-
tary cyber realm will be considerably more modest. What is unclear is the 
degree to which cyber “have” countries will be, rightly or wrongly, more 
concerned with cyber threats and the dangers they pose because of risks to 
military capabilities or broader economic interests.25  
Like Y2K, there is a danger that overemphasis on predictions of catas-
trophe will heavily influence how the threat is perceived and responded to 
by a State. The perception of the threat may also be affected by the tools 
available to the State to respond. This could mean that in countries without 
the same level of dedicated military resources as some developed countries 
the cyber challenge could be viewed as less military in nature. It may more 
naturally lead to discussion of alternatives to the use of force and increased 
international dialogue and cooperation. Of course, the challenge facing pol-
icy makers is whether those options are sufficient to confront the threat.  
At the same time other States, which have not—or cannot—develop 
sophisticated cyber capabilities, may also have a particular interest in ensur-
ing international law operates as a brake on the cyber warfare activities of 
the “have” States. There is nothing new in using the law for that purpose. 
It has been at the heart of the post-World War I and -World War II em-
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phasis on the jus ad bellum restrains on the recourse to war.26 Therefore, 
while countries like the United States may seize the opportunity to shape 
the international legal discussion regarding regulation of the cyber domain, 
so will those countries that seek to reinforce the need for restraint.27 In this 
respect, international law will need to reflect standards that apply to all 
countries. 
In any event, all military cyber forces and their legal advisors will be 
faced with a number of challenges as the march down the cyber highway 
proceeds. The challenges can be placed into two broad categories: first, the 
prevalent, indeed predominate non-military use of cyber in society.  Sec-
ond, in a dialogue that is just starting to take place in a public way, is the 
need to reach consensus on how the international law can and should bring 
a potential technical “beast,” made of “1s” and “0s,” to heel on this very 
human journey down the cyber roadway. If the predictions of catastrophe 
are true, this makes the need for regulation all the more pressing. However, 
as will become evident, efforts to provide law and order in the cyber world 
will be challenged by the fact that as a policy option the use of cyber to in-
fluence the security environment seems so attractive. 
This article will address these challenges in three parts. First, there will 
be an outline of a unique aspect of the cyber domain in the context of its 
status as a new global commons and its prevalence within modern society. 
As a result there will be many stakeholders who have views that will impact 
on the regulation of cyber activity. Second, the analysis will turn to specific 
legal challenges. This part will look at civilian participation in cyber conflict, 
consider the theoretical approaches applied when assessing cyber opera-
tions as a use of force, look at the use of the cyber domain for counter-
measures short of war and address the significant potential for confusion at 
a foundational level regarding the use of the term “attack.” Finally, the po-
tential for successfully integrating cyber operations into a legal framework 
will be considered by reference to efforts during the twenty-first century to 
regulate technologically advanced aerial warfare. Ultimately the road ahead 
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will be identified as a challenging one, but with an attainable goal that will 
require flexibility in applying traditional legal principles to the cyber do-
main. 
 
II. A VOICE AT THE TABLE? 
 
A key challenge for those seeking to attract the attention of lawyers and 
policy makers regarding the dangers and opportunities of military cyber 
capabilities is getting a voice at the table that is heard and understood. To 
get a sense of the scope and scale of the challenge, it is useful to look at 
national policies regarding cyber. Consistent with the United States having 
an advanced cyber capability and the openness inherent in it being a de-
mocracy, that country has a number of publically available defense related 
documents on the issue.28 It is the overarching 2011 national strategy doc-
ument International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a 
Networked World that broadly defines the nature of the international cyber 
challenge.29 It states:  
 
[D]igital infrastructure is increasingly the backbone of prosperous econ-
omies, vigorous research communities, strong militaries, transparent gov-
ernments, and free societies. As never before, information technology is 
fostering transnational dialogue and facilitating the global flow of goods 
and services. These social and trade links have become indispensable to 
our daily lives. . . . The reach of networked technology is pervasive and 
global. For all nations, the underlying digital infrastructure is or will soon 
become a national asset.30 
 
Of course, States must defend their national assets; however, this 
statement raises a number of profound issues. Can a State physically de-
fend all of its national digital assets? What is the cost in terms of global dis-
course and, in particular, international commerce? If national assets are de-
fended will it mean reduced, or even truncated, access to the computer sys-
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tems that underpin the information superhighway for global participants? 
There is also the more mundane bureaucratic question of who needs to be 
sitting around the table at the highest levels of government to make those 
decisions in order to ensure the military imperatives are properly weighed 
against the economic and social costs of seeking to regulate the cyber do-
main. 
Another fundamental issue is whether national assets effectively lose 
their parochial status because they are part of an interconnected network 
that “is pervasive and global.”31 Is the legal control of the digital world 
“territorial” in the sense of coming exclusively under State sovereignty? To 
a certain extent the answer to this question is yes. The international legal 
framework is founded on the concept of the post-Westphalian State. It 
simply makes sense that the regulation of a fundamentally international 
technology would be State-based and State-focused as well. This is not to 
take away from the role that international institutions play or the impact of 
increasing globalization, however, States “retain their attraction as the pri-
mary focus for the social activity of humankind and thus for international 
law.”32  
But the boundaries of national jurisdiction in the cyber world are not 
clear. The cyber environment can be equated to a global commons, such as 
the oceans, although it has also been noted that “unlike the other domains, 
cyberspace has no physical obstacles, nor ‘real’ boundaries like a shore.”33 
The cyber domain is also unique in that it is manmade.34 International regu-
lation of the maritime domain has been slow but steady, as it has had to 
balance the rights of States, territorial jurisdiction, freedom of navigation 
and private economic interests. It has been noted that “[t]he story of the 
evolution of [the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] is the imperative 
that the private sector must be given a place if real progress in regulating 
the commons is to be made.”35 Ultimately, the regulation of global com-
mons, as is evidenced by the law of the sea, “ha[s] a significant effect on 
the exercise of both belligerent and neutral rights during time of armed 
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conflict.”36 Private, particularly commercial, interests in the cyber domain 
will also have to be taken into account in the regulation of cyber conflict in 
much that same way that neutrality has impacted on international humani-
tarian law.37  
Further, not all States have embraced international regulation of the 
oceans. While a State, like the United States, may have a significant interest 
in adopting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), conflicting ideas of national security interests have prevented it 
from doing so.38 The United States military supports ratification.39 Rather 
than be bound by such regulation, however, a certain advantage has been 
perceived within the legislative branch of the United States government in 
the constructive ambiguity of having an international regime in place, but 
not being technically subject to its constraints.40 The same result could oc-
cur regarding a number of the players in the cyber domain. Ambiguity of-
ten equates to freedom of action. Freedom, however, can come at the ex-
pense of other States understanding the motives and the potential action to 
be taken by a nation. It can also impact adversely on the issue of accounta-
bility. 
It is also not clear how—or if—States and their military forces will 
want to embrace international regulation when the use of cyber for military 
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operations has yet to be fully developed or exercised. Such reluctance may 
also impact the decisions of less dominant States that want to avoid con-
trols on its use favored by a more dominant cyber power. A military cyber 
capability provides a potential asymmetric advantage that may be simply 
too attractive an option for those States seeking to level the security playing 
field.41 As John Arquilla has noted, “[n]o country may be foolish enough to 
engage the incomparable U.S. military in open battle, but we seem like fair-
ly easy pickings to the computer mice that may soon roar.”42 Rather, the 
pressure for regulation may ultimately come from major industrialized 
States once they feel threatened, since “dependence on complex cyber sys-
tems for support of military and economic activities creates new vulnerabil-
ities in large states that can be exploited by non-state actors.”43  
Given the pervasive role played by the cyber domain in modern socie-
ty, it also is unlikely that national security law and policy makers will unilat-
erally determine the outcome of the cyber debate. The interests of individ-
ual States and the views of their military forces on what is needed for de-
fense will be just two of the many voices at the table to discuss what, if any, 
rules are established to regulate the defense of the national cyber systems.44 
One issue will be the relative importance States place on potential threats 
in a defense context in relation to very real non-military cyber threats that 
States presently face. For countries, such as the United Kingdom and Can-
ada, the relatively low prioritization of the cyber challenge in terms of de-
fense is reflected in the limited space their national cyber strategies devote 
to the topic. Further, in reading national policies’ references to “defense,” 
the term cannot be assumed to have a military context as it often means 
protection against criminal activity and espionage. Substantive reference to 
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cyber and the role of military forces is usually found somewhere towards 
the back of the strategy.45  
Although there appears to be much to defend in terms of its priorities, 
the subject of defense competes for space with privacy, business security 
products, cyber crime, cyber fraud and even the denial of safe havens to 
cyber criminals.46 It appears that consideration of cyber “national defense,” 
using the term in a jus ad bellum context, and the law that frames it in the 
post-UN Charter world, have been introduced rather late into the journey 
down the cyber roadway. This raises questions as to whether States have 
actually viewed the military threat to be as a grave as some would suggest, 
or whether it is criminal activity that is seen to form the most significant 
challenge. 
 The focus on issues other than cyber warfare is a reality and, in 
many respects, so it should be. Most citizens are more concerned with los-
ing money from their bank account or a lowering of their credit rating than 
being the subject of an actual armed cyber attack that would cause the Se-
curity Council to meet to discuss two States having gone to war.47 Cyber is 
different. More citizens rely on, and can relate to, the cyber realm. It is the 
predominance of cyber in the everyday lives of developed and, increasingly, 
less-developed States that will put considerable pressure on lawyers to 
closely consider how traditional security related concepts and principles of 
international law apply to this new form of warfare.  
 
III. THE LEGAL CHALLENGE 
 
A. Participation in Cyber Conflict 
 
When thinking about the cyber domain, lawyers who work with national 
defense issues, in particular the use of military force may be challenged to 
rethink long-held notions of international law. For example, one area that 
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may be impacted by the unique aspects of cyber warfare is the concept of 
legitimate participants in warfare. A hallmark of contemporary international 
law and war is the separation of the rules governing the conduct of warfare 
from those constraining the recourse to war.48 While it is important to have 
the jus ad bellum considered separately from the jus in bello (or international 
humanitarian law) in order to maintain the “equal application” principle 
regarding the rules that govern warfare, that cannot always be easily done. 
This is particularly evident regarding the status of persons taking part in 
hostilities. The breadth of civilian involvement in the cyber domain, both 
inside and outside of government, will place even greater stress on tradi-
tional notions of legitimate participation in armed conflict. 
One of the challenges arising from the twentieth century obsession 
with restricting inter-State armed conflict has been that the jus ad bellum has 
come to be associated narrowly with national self-defense. However, re-
flecting its roots in just war theory, the jus ad bellum contains a number of 
other fundamental principles, such as fighting for the “proper authority.”49 
The application of this principle leads, at times, to a continuing interaction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello that is perhaps most obviously dis-
played when legitimate participation in conflict is assessed. If you fight for 
the “proper authority” (i.e., a State) then you are “legitimate,” having both 
the right to participate in armed conflict and gain the protected status of 
prisoner of war. This legitimate status is recognized in foundational hu-
manitarian law treaty documents.50  In addition, while the jus ad bellum is 
traditionally viewed not as being applicable to non-international armed 
conflict,51 the principle of proper authority effectively makes those mem-
                                                                                                                      
48. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2d ed. 2010) (“The fundamental postulate of the jus in 
bello is the equal application of its legal norms to all Belligerent Parties, regardless of their 
relative standing in the eyes of the jus ad bellum.”). 
49. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 30 (1999) 
(outlining the jus ad bellum principles found under positive international law as being: just 
cause, right or proper authority, right intention, proportionality of ends, last resort, rea-
sonable hope of success and the aim of peace). 
50. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 1–3, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
4.A, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
51. Marco Sassoli, Ius ad Bellum and Jus in Bello—The Separation between the Legality of 
the Use of Force and Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated?, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 241, 254 (Mi-













bers of the security forces who fight for States the legitimate actors in such 
conflicts. It is the non-State actors whose activities are criminalized.52 
That said, one of the realities of the cyber domain is that combatants in 
international armed conflict and security personnel in internal ones cannot 
defend all the national digital assets on their own. Those assets, and the 
threats posed to them, are too numerous and broadly distributed.53 In many 
respects cyber activity represents a true expansion of the “home front” as 
an area of operations, even into the boardrooms and bedrooms of the na-
tion. To the extent the introduction of airpower represented a kinetic 
means by which State-directed violence could be extended to a broad range 
of targets beyond national borders, cyber provides an even more expanded 
and in some ways more intimate threat.  
As a result, many of the potential participants in this cyber war are like-
ly not to be wearing uniforms or bearing arms, at least in the traditional 
sense. Due to its scope and scale, this represents a civilian involvement that 
appears significantly more challenging in terms of assessing its legitimacy 
than the contemporary controversy regarding Central Intelligence Agency 
personnel conducting drone strikes.54 This leads to fundamental questions 
regarding the status of civilians who man the computer defenses of a State. 
Are they direct participants in hostilities? Do they really have to wear a uni-
form and be sworn into the armed forces of the State to lawfully participate 
in these activities? The answers may simply be that they are legitimately 
carrying out the responsibilities assigned to them in the same fashion as the 
police officers that arrested German saboteurs who had surreptitiously 
                                                                                                                      
exists concerning non-international armed conflicts, since such conflicts are neither justi-
fied nor prohibited by international law.”). 
52. See G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 14 (1958) (discussing at-
tempts at the end of World War II to extend the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to 
internal conflicts and noting that “proposals giving insurgents a legal status, and conse-
quently support, would hamper the Government in its measures of legitimate repression”) 
(emphasis added). 
53. Paul Ducheine, Joop Voetelink, Jan Stinissen & Terry Gill, Towards a Legal Frame-
work for Military Cyber Operations, in CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 
5, at 106 (“Given the characteristics of the threats as well as the ‘battlefield’ . . . , govern-
ments alone are incapable of responding adequately as they are heavily dependent upon 
private partners such as internet providers.”). 
54. Andrew Burt & Alex Wagner, Blurred Lines: An Argument for a More Robust Legal 
Framework Governing the CIA Drone Program, 38 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 












landed on the shores of the United States during World War II55 or Jose 
Padilla when he landed in Chicago in 2002.56 In complying with the re-
quirements of domestic law in the performance of their duties, they are not 
illegitimate under international law. Nor should they be liable to foreign 
prosecution for doing so. Indeed, it would have been an odd result to sug-
gest that any apprehension of the saboteurs, who in today’s terminology 
were unprivileged belligerents, had to be carried out by United States mili-
tary personnel regardless of the geographic location. 
The widespread involvement of civilians in the defense of computer 
networks could once again put the fundamental humanitarian law principle 
of distinction under pressure. In this instance, it will not be the factory 
workers of World War II who are considered to be “quasi-combatants,” 
but rather potentially those who maintain the integrity and security of 
computer networks in their everyday employment.57 It will be difficult to 
say that those civilians are far away from the battlefield when the cyber 
conflict is occurring literally in their laps. In this respect, they are different 
than the third echelon civilian supply workers or strategic level intelligence 
analysts who often seem to get a “geographic” pass when direct participa-
tion in hostilities (DPH) is considered. Cyber participants may be harder to 
separate from the action that is occurring literally at their fingertips. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its Interpretive Guid-
ance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humani-
tarian Law, appears to avoid this issue by concentrating on computer net-
work attacks against military systems58 and the offensive use of cyber.59 
That Interpretive Guidance notes that for “remote-controlled (i.e. geograph-
                                                                                                                      
55. LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL 33–36 (2d ed. 2005) (outlining the ar-
rest of the saboteurs). 
56. See Donna Leinwand & Jack Kelley, U.S. Citizen Arrested in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 
2002/06/10/terror-arrest.htm 
57. In seeking to justify attacks on factory workers as quasi-combatants, a practice no 
longer permitted under international law, one author explained: 
 
It is not a question of political or moral support, or even of material support in 
forms that could not possibly be called warlike. What justifies the deliberate attack on the 
people concerned is that they are engaged in work which his akin to that done by uni-
formed men in the field. They are helping to pass the ammunition. 
 
J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 47 (3d ed. 1947). 
58. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 48, 50 (2009) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]. 













ically remote) missiles, unmanned aircraft and computer network attacks,” 
the “causal relationship between the employment of such means and the 
ensuing harm remains direct regardless of temporal or geographical prox-
imity.”60 The legal and practical challenge is that the symbiotic relationship 
between offense and defense means the two concepts cannot be readily 
divorced. As a result, participation in the defense of computer systems rais-
es the specter of DPH. 
The transformative nature of cyber is reflected in the example of a fif-
ty-nine-year-old retired grandmother who was reported in a Canadian 
newspaper in June of 2011 to be passing on information obtained through 
the social media site Facebook to a NATO twitter account. The infor-
mation was said to include the coordinates of Colonel Gadhafi’s forces’ 
temporary headquarters in Libya, “along with the longitude and latitude for 
other targets.”61 The woman lived in central Canada just north of the Unit-
ed States border, obviously a considerable distance from the Libyan battle-
field.62 Another person passing on details regarding fuel tankers at a Libyan 
port was reported to be a forty-eight-year-old ice cream business supervisor 
in Arizona.63 Is a person who takes information posted by someone else 
from the web and passes it on taking a direct part in hostilities? The Inter-
pretive Guidance makes a link between the transmittal of tactical intelligence 
and the potential causation of harm resulting from any targeting decision.64 
Scenarios such as these raise questions of degrees of remoteness and where 
the line will be drawn on cyber DPH.65  
In any event, so what if civilians are involved in cyber conflict? Such 
participation is not illegal under international humanitarian law unless it 
engages issues of perfidy, although some activity does theoretically raise 
                                                                                                                      
60. Id. at 55. 
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64. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 58, at 54–55 (“More precisely, where a specific act 
does not on its own directly cause the required threshold of harm, the requirement of di-
rect causation would still be fulfilled where the act constitutes an integral part of a con-
crete and coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harm.”).  
65. Smith, supra note 61 (noting “[a] Twitter account with apparent links to the British 
military has even taken the unusual step of asking users to submit the precise co-ordinates 












questions of prosecution under the domestic jurisdiction of an opposing 
State if a participant is ever captured.66 It also does not mean there could 
not be other potential consequences. For example, the operators of un-
manned drones are located in the United States and the strikes are occur-
ring in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere on the other side of the globe.67 
Cyber connectivity means, however, that direct participants may be sub-
jected to a cyber response, although likely one leading to a denial-of-access 
or disabling of means rather than one that is destructive in nature.  
If it is not participants themselves, then the State in which they are op-
erating may draw the attention of the targeted State.  This is not necessarily 
problematic when that State itself is already a belligerent in the armed con-
flict. However, for the States that conducted the bombing campaign in 
Libya, it might have come as a shock if a cyber response from the govern-
ment of Libya had been directed at them from so far away. In other situa-
tions where the State has no intentions of being a belligerent, the global 
nature of cyber has the potential to engage the responsibility of States for 
activities emanating from their territory much more broadly and swiftly 
than in the past. For example, it is reported that when it was subjected to 
distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against its websites during the 
2008 conflict with Russia, Georgia transferred official Internet assets to the 
United States, Estonia and Poland.68 This has raised questions regarding 
United States neutrality. In this respect, “[t]he fact that American IT com-
panies provided assistance to Georgia, a cyber belligerent, apparently with-
out the knowledge or approval of the U.S. government, illustrates what is 
likely to become a significant policy issue.”69  
                                                                                                                      
66. See ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICT 305 (1976) (ex-
plaining that a person not having the status of lawful combatant “may be punished under 
the internal criminal legislation of the adversary for having committed hostile acts in viola-
tion of its provision (e.g. for murder), even if these acts do not constitute war crimes un-
der international law”). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 35–39 (discussing the conse-
quences of unlawful combatancy).  
67. See Elizabeth Bumiller, A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot a World Away, NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/us/drone-
pilots-waiting-for-a-kill-shot-7000-miles-away.html?pagewanted=all; MATT J. MARTIN, 
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STORY 30 (2010). 
68. Stephen W. Korns & Joshua E. Kastenberg, Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook, PARAME-
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If civilian participation in cyber warfare from either an offensive or de-
fensive perspective is seen as problematic, what is the true role for those in 
uniform and those who wear more casual attire? Given the nature of the 
medium, the scope of the activity and the importance of the information, it 
appears that international lawyers are not going to easily put such “unprivi-
leged” participation back in the traditional combatant box. And given this 
interface with citizens on the domestic front, the discussion inevitably will 
not be just about the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, or who can 
fight or not, but also domestic privacy, criminal law, and human and civil 
rights. This ultimately will require a more holistic application of the law 
impacting on operations. Perhaps this requirement to consider the broader 
implications of cyber conflict will force an application of operational law 
spanning numerous legal disciplines rather than deal with the issues com-
partmentalized into traditional legal silos.70  
International lawyers are also going to have to be prepared to explain 
to a varied group of colleagues, both lawyers and non-lawyers, why com-
batant status matters in a cyber conflict with global reach but tangible do-
mestic impact. It also means that some military lawyers, whose area of ex-
pertise may be limited to the law of armed conflict, will need to become 
much better acquainted with the impact jus ad bellum, international human 
rights law and domestic law have on cyber operations. At a minimum, it 
will present a daunting educational, training and doctrinal challenge for 
many military and civilian government legal advisors.  
 
B. An “Armed” Attack: Really? 
 
1. Cyber Weapons and Effects 
 
Notwithstanding the requirement to come to grips with the breadth of ci-
vilian participation in cyber operations, perhaps the greatest challenge for 
international lawyers will be to identify when cyber attacks reach the 
threshold necessary for a State to legitimately respond in self-defense.71 
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With international law indicating “it will be necessary to distinguish the 
most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) 
from other less grave forms” the international legal community has strug-
gled with identifying the gravity threshold.72 The mining of a warship might 
meet that threshold,73 but mere frontier incidents would not.74 Given this 
lack of consensus regarding kinetic uses of force, it is likely cyber attacks 
will present an even greater challenge. 
To even begin to address that issue, there first must be an understand-
ing that a computer is potentially a weapon. In a legal context, a weapon is 
assessed both as a means and method of warfare that is of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.75 However, the nature of the 
challenge is perhaps most clearly framed in non-legal terms. A weapon has 
been defined as: “a thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or 
physical damage: nuclear weapons.”76   
This concept of weapon creates two challenges in the cyber domain. 
The first is the need to convince the broader public that computers (the 
laptops, desktops, tablets and even phones carried by much of the public, 
including, no doubt, committed pacifists) are, in fact, weapons like rifles, 
artillery and fighter aircraft. Of course, as was tragically demonstrated dur-
ing the genocide in Rwanda, even basic implements such as knives and ma-
chetes can be turned into an instrument of mass death.77 However, the is-
sue is whether the ubiquitous computer, which requires a certain level of 
sophistication to operate, but does not project a shell or offer much in the 
way of being a blunt instrument, could also be used as a weapon in its own 
right.  
                                                                                                                      
72. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
73. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6) (“The Court does not 
exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to 
bring into play the ‘inherent right of self-defence’. . . .”); See also Waxman, supra note 44, at 
438 (indicating the United States argued successfully for a low Article 51 threshold.). 
74. Nicaragua, supra note 71, ¶ 194. 
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Second, there must be an acceptance that cyber means can inflict bodi-
ly harm or physical damage. This is an area where determining the lex lata 
(what the law is) for the jus ad bellum has been particularly challenging. It 
has led to efforts to assess the “effects” generated by a computer by an 
analogy to kinetic weapons. Among the questions being debated is whether 
computer attacks should be looked at using an instrument-based approach 
(i.e., one that produces equivalent results to a kinetics-based attack) in as-
sessing whether such an attack can reach the level of an armed attack under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.78 However, the conceptual and legal path 
connecting the pressing of a computer key to ultimately causing a destruc-
tive effect approaching that of an armed attack is anything but straightfor-
ward. It might be analogized to the bombing of a dam gate thereby releas-
ing floodwaters. As the Stuxnet attack has demonstrated, physical damage 
can occur. That is not the only way that cyber operations can lead to physi-
cal damage, death or injury. For example, a cyber penetration of a SCADA 
system could be considered the same as a covert insertion of a Special 
Forces team, which, after gaining access to the control facility, turns the 
dial opening the gates. While such activity might constitute an armed at-
tack, the overall analysis would benefit by not jumping to a bullets and 
bombs (i.e., kinetic) approach.79  
Another method for considering what constitutes an armed attack is 
the effects-based approach, i.e., whether it produces severe enough effects 
that it warrants treatment as an armed attack. Jeffrey Carr provides the ex-
ample of an armed attack in which one party “manipulated information 
across a state’s banking and financial institutions to seriously disrupt com-
merce in the state.”80 This approach does not try to equate the use of cyber 
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a cyber attack used to shut down a power grid is an armed attack. This is because shutting 
down a power grid typically required dropping a bomb on a power station or some other 
kinetic use of force to incapacitate the grid. Since conventional munitions were previously 
required to achieve the result, under the instrument-based approach the cyber attack is 
therefore treated the same way. 
 
CARR, supra note 1, at 59 
79. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 212 (5th ed. 2011) 
(“If CNA [computer network attack] were to cause severe damage to property or even 
human fatalities (as a result, e.g., of the shutdown of computers controlling waterworks 
and damns, leading to the flooding of inhabited areas), it would qualify as an armed at-
tack.”). 













to a kinetic attack, but rather seeks to assess the quantum of loss in an eco-
nomic sense. The challenge here is twofold. First, as has been noted, inter-
national law has struggled with the very notion of categorizing loss in a ki-
netic context. It is not clear how this approach will add any greater clarity. 
Second, the effects-based approach appears to involve a particularly com-
mercial calculus.   
It is not clear where the separation is between loss, damage, disruption, 
theft and simple espionage with regard to the ability to conduct commerce. 
Further, given the nature of international commercial relations, it is not 
clear whether this approach only involves attacks on nationally owned or 
based corporations, international corporations and their subsidiaries, pri-
vate financial institutions, e.g., Wall Street, or institutions more closely as-
sociated with the State, such as the Federal Reserve in the United States. 
What this approach does do is highlight that the basis for an armed at-
tack has always included an economic component. For example, the estab-
lishment of a blockade by one State against another, albeit with the threat 
of military force backing it, could be seen as an armed attack justifying a 
response in self-defense.81 It is not clear, however, that the likely means of 
a cyber blockade, a DDoS attack, even falls under the effects-based ap-
proach or equates to a use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter? It 
must constitute a use of force before it can be considered as an armed at-
tack.  
This raises the question of whether the use of force under Article 2(4) 
is broader than simply armed force extended to economic matters. Such an 
interpretation is one that most Western economically powerful States and 
international lawyers have resisted, although “developing countries and 
formerly the Eastern bloc countries have repeatedly claimed that the pro-
hibition on the use of force also comprises other forms of force, for in-
stance, political and, in particular, economic coercion.”82  
                                                                                                                      
a cyber attack that manipulated information across a state’s banking and financial in-
stitutions to seriously disrupt commerce in the state is an armed attack. Although the 
manipulation of information does not resemble a kinetic attack, as required under an 
instrument-based approach, the disruptive effects that the attack had on the state’s 
economy is a severe enough overall consequence that it warrants treatment as an 
armed attack. 
 
CARR, supra note 1, at 59 
81. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY 788, 797 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).  
82. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in id. at 112, 118. See also CHRISTINE GRAY, 













Malcolm Shaw notes this issue was considered in the past in “light of 
the Arab oil weapon used in 1973-4 against States deemed favorable to Is-
rael.”83 While he indicates there is a case to be made that such actions are 
contrary to the Charter, ultimately “whether such action constitutes a viola-
tion of Article 2(4) is dubious.”84 The prevailing view is that economic co-
ercion would not qualify as a use of force under Article 2(4), let alone form 
the justification for acting in self-defense under Article 51.85 In this respect 
it has been noted, “were this provision [Article 2(4)] to extend to other 
forms of force, States would be left with no means of exerting pressure on 
other States that violate the law.”86 This is an important issue when consid-
ering the use of cyber means in the form of countermeasures. 
Given this background, an effort by economically powerful States, such 
as the United States, that have computer-based economies to now widen 
the basis for reaction in self-defense by including the economic impact of 
computer activity as an armed attack could have unintended consequences 
if it results in a broadening of Article 2(4) to include economic coercion. 
This is not to suggest it should not be done, but in doing so a careful analy-
sis needs to be undertaken that looks beyond the narrow interests of the 
more technologically advanced States. At the same time, it would also be 
ironic if less economically developed States, which might also have less ad-
vanced cyber capabilities, embraced an argument that such “economic” 
focused uses of cyber were not an armed attack under international law 
because of the asymmetric advantage they now might have.  
                                                                                                                      
tween developed and developing states as to whether ‘the use of force’ includes not only 
armed force but economic coercion.”); Waxman, supra note 44, at 428–29. 
83. SHAW, supra note 32, at 1125. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack 
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885 (1999), reprinted in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT 
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84. SHAW, supra note 32, at 1125. 
85. See DINSTEIN, supra note 79, at 88 (“[W]hen studied in context, the term ‘force’ in 
Article 2(4) must denote violence. It does not matter what specific means—kinetic or elec-
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2. Cyber and Force 
 
Of course, even before there is a discussion of armed attack there must be 
acceptance that there is a use of force.87 There is an interpretation of the 
law developed in 1999 by Michael Schmitt that cyber specific criteria, e.g., 
severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability and presump-
tive legitimacy, could be applied to assess if a use of force has occurred.88 
These criteria appear to fall well within the concept of lex ferenda, or what 
the law ought to be. Indeed, the 2013 Tallinn Manual, a project in which this 
author participated, indicates the criteria are not to be viewed as formal 
legal requirements, but rather as factors “that influence States making use 
of force assessments.”89  
Of note, these factors are set out in the Manual commentary rather than 
the rules.90 In the Tallinn Manual, it is stated the rules “reflect consensus 
among the Experts as to the applicable lex lata, that is, the law currently 
governing cyber conflict. It does not set forth lex ferenda, best practice, or 
preferred policy.”91 The commentary is “intended to identify its legal basis, 
explain its normative content, address practical implications in the cyber 
context, and set forth differing positions as to scope or interpretation.”92 
The fact that the lex lata in this instance is justified by such extensive refer-
ence to relatively recent interpretations of the law, even if it was only in the 
context of taking note of the theory, stands out as an example of the chal-
lenge presented by cyber warfare.93 The technology is new, indeed cutting 
                                                                                                                      
87. For an excellent discussion of Article 2(4) in the cyber context, see Waxman, supra 
note 44. 
88. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 26. 
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Acts that injure or kill persons or damage or destroy objects are unambiguously uses of 
force (see commentary to Rule 13 expressing an analogous conclusion, but requiring the 
harm to be ‘significant’). Since other cases are less clear, the International Group of Ex-
perts took notice of an approach that seeks to assess the likelihood that States will charac-
terise a cyber operation as a use of force. The method expounded operates on the premise 
that in the absence of a conclusive definitional threshold, States contemplating cyber op-
erations, or that are the target thereof, must be highly sensitive to the international com-















edge, but the established law is “old” law, which is, in many ways, retro-
spective to the immediate post-World War II era.  
What adopting these factors would mean is an acceptance of a dual 
threshold for assessing force and cyber operations. In this respect, the Tal-
linn Manual indicates “[a] cyber operation constitutes a use of force when 
its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level 
of a use of force.”94 Similarly, “[w]hether a cyber operation constitutes an 
armed attack depends on its scale and effects.”95 The Manual relies on the 
same interpretation of the Nicaragua decision to explain the use of the term 
“scale and effect” as the basis for assessing both the use of force96 and 
armed attack.97 However, “[t]he scale and effects required for an act to be 
characterised as an armed attack necessarily exceed those qualifying the act 
as a use of force.”98  
While this is a sound interpretation of widely accepted principles of in-
ternational law as it has developed to date, it is not clear how well this 
standard will be applied in practice. A majority of the experts writing the 
Manual were reported to have believed “the critical factor was whether the 
effects of a cyber operation, as distinct from the means used to achieve 
those effects, were analogous to those that would result from an action 
otherwise qualifying as a kinetic armed attack.”99 This suggests an instru-
ments-based approach, although the scale-and-effects argument arguably 
fits more comfortably with the effects-based approach. There is a degree of 
overlap between both approaches in that one of the factors that often 
points to a kinetic armed attack is the tangibly measurable effects created 
by that violence. 
The instruments-based approach appears to be the one favored by the 
United States Government for assessing if a use of force has occurred. As 
was indicated by the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh in 
September 2012, “if the physical consequences of a cyber attack work the 
kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, 
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that cyber attack should equally be considered a use of force.”100 Of note, 
these references were made with respect to meeting the basic threshold of 
a use of force. Mr. Koh also reiterated the United States’ position that 
“there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an ‘armed at-
tack’ that may warrant a forcible response.”101 While this continues to place 
the United States in an outlier position in relation to the broader interna-
tional community regarding the legal basis for acting in self-defense, there 
is little chance that a cyber context would have changed this approach giv-
en the general lack of consensus regarding what constitutes a use of force 
in that domain. That said, the United States, or any other State that takes 
this position, will still need to identify the threshold for a use of force at 
which point a response in self-defense would be justified. 
Further, it is not clear if any message can be taken from the fact that 
the examples provided—the causing of a nuclear plant meltdown, opening 
dam doors and disabling air traffic control—did not include an attack on 
the financial markets.102 Its omission may simply reflect what conceptually 
difficult issues such an attack poses for traditional international law. These 
examples also do not clearly establish the minimum threshold upon which 
action is considered justified. Further, it was noted that “there are other 
types of cyber actions that do not have a clear kinetic parallel, which raise 
profound questions about exactly what we mean by ‘force.’”103 
The Tallinn Manual does address attacks on financial institutions; how-
ever, the commentary discussion of what is described as the “classic sce-
nario” of an attack on the New York Stock Exchange reflected quite divid-
ed opinions that go to the heart of the discussion of regulating force in the 
cyber domain.104 There is a danger that the reference to the New York 
Stock Exchange shows a Western and, in particular, U.S. concern with in-
terference with commerce. An interesting issue is whether disruption of the 
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Shanghai, Tokyo or London stock exchanges would garner the same con-
cerns. Further, given the interconnected nature of the financial markets, if 
there was an attack on one of these other exchanges could another State 
claim it was an attack on their economic interests, if they were adversely 
impacted collaterally, even though the State hosting the targeted exchange 
did not share the view? This lack of consensus and the unclear theoretical 
underpinning for such activity to be called an armed attack suggests caution 
is required in coming to any conclusions at this stage.  
There is a significant danger in overstating the effects of cyber attacks 
even when they impact on infrastructure such as dams, power generation 
facilities or other utilities. Again it may be helpful to return to the Y2K ex-
perience. Notwithstanding dire predictions regarding potential failures of 
SCADA and other computerized systems controlling pipelines, electrical 
grids, trains and even weapon systems,105 a study of many of these systems 
at the time of Y2K demonstrated they were quite resilient. As the United 
States Y2K Study indicated, critical industries “include a great deal of com-
peting systems created by deregulation and technological advancements in 
recent decades.”106 A particular exception was the electrical power distribu-
tion network; however, even here there was substantial redundancy.107 As 
that study noted in its discussion of critical infrastructure, “[i]n an economy 
as large as the United States, hundreds and perhaps thousands of failures in 
‘critical infrastructure’ electricity or water systems could occur before the 
impact would be great enough before there would be a significant im-
pact.”108  
Another challenge in assessing the impact of cyber operations is that 
the infrastructure itself may be particularly vulnerable to being adversely 
affected by other factors unrelated to the intensity of the cyber activity. In 
other words a piece of malware may not, on its own, be a use of force or 
an attack, although its presence may have unintended consequences. It is 
reported that in 2003, fifty million people were out of power in the eastern 
United States and central Canada because a falling tree created a surge in a 
power line that apparently slowed back up controls, in part, because of a 
software glitch and computer malware.109 In situations such as this, sorting 
out the responsibility for the actual blackout may be difficult to ascertain.  
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One challenge appears to be the relative reliability and robustness of the 
power grid. For example, a former Energy Secretary in the United States 
noted notwithstanding U.S. military and economic might has  
 
a grid that is antiquated, that is Third World, that needs beefing up. We've 
got very weak power transmission lines and generation capacity. That's 
because there hasn't been investment in our electricity grid because 
there's been no competition, because there's been a lot of monopoly con-
trol of utilities in this country.110  
 
Not only does there need to be further study to gather the facts, the legal 
community should reach out to other disciplines to become better in-
formed before embracing the notion that a cyber-induced power failure 
generally provides the threshold for the existence of an armed attack. 
Another factor to be considered in assessing the scale and effects of 
cyber operations is that many populations have shown themselves to be 
quite resilient when confronted with either man-made or natural disasters. 
This has included significant power failures or blackouts affecting millions 
of persons both within a country and extending across borders. In addition 
to the above-mentioned 2003 North American incident, significant black-
outs have occurred in Europe in 2006111 and more recently in India in 
2012.112 Some disruptions have occurred in inhospitable climates, such as in 
Canada as a result of an ice storm during the winter of 1998113 and in the 
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United States in 2009.114 Given that States deal with these types of chal-
lenges on a fairly regular basis, this may inoculate their societies from rush-
ing to a conclusion that cyber events leading to SCADA interference 
should be viewed as such a threat to national security that going to war is 
warranted.  
As a result, to take the position that cyber activity causing a power fail-
ure generally establishes the threshold for an armed attack, or even consti-
tutes a use of force permitting an armed response if the United States posi-
tion is applied, could be problematic. Without developing a generally 
agreed to scale-and-effects assessment of the actual, or even potential, im-
pact of such cyber activity a State could embark down a course leading to 
an armed conflict involving not only wider cyber attacks, but also kinetic 
violence.  
It may be that the international law standard of a grave use of force jus-
tifying action in self-defense may not readily translate in equivalency to the 
effects of a power failure that is not exceptionally disruptive to the overall 
functioning of the economy of a State, or cause a substantial loss of life.115 
The question from an ad bellum perspective is at what point effects that can 
also be caused by human frailty or weather should be equated to an armed 
attack, such that they justifiably prompt a response that could result in two 
or more nations going to war.  
That is not to say that interference with SCADA systems could not 
reach the threshold of an armed attack if you apply a scale-and-effects ap-
proach. Not all cyber-induced failures of power and other industries would 
necessarily reach that threshold, however. Indeed, there is some skepticism 
that a purely cyber war will ever develop that would be “violent, instrumen-
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A real advantage of cyber operations is that much of the activity occurs 
outside of the public eye at a micro level not normally associated with 
armed conflict. This presents two types of opportunities for a State. One is 
to covertly engage in activity that reaches the level of a use of force or an 
armed attack and rely on such activity not being discovered or attributed to 
that State.117 Such activity is problematic from an international law perspec-
tive. Another advantage of this new technology is that it provides a means 
for a State to act in response to threats without crossing the armed conflict 
threshold. In effect, it is one of the means by which wider and more violent 
conflict can be avoided in the first place. When the cyber activity amounts 
to an internationally wrongful act, there are options short of war for re-
sponding to threats under the international legal system. The problem is 
that those responses are often excluded—or at least pushed into the back-
ground—in the contemporary dialogue regarding operations in the cyber 
domain which appears to focus on force.  
There is the very real danger that focusing discussion on the less likely 
occurrence of armed attack will overshadow the potential use of cyber in 
other circumstances. In this regard a cyber weapon might be thought of in 
less bellicose terms by considering it in the context of the rest of the Ox-
ford definition: “a means of gaining an advantage or defending oneself in a 
conflict or contest: resignation threats had long been a weapon in his armoury.”118 
Perhaps a primary function of cyber is more accurately considered as a 
weapon of a different sort, one divorced from those producing kinetic re-
sults. Cyber should not necessarily be seen as having a violence-producing 
capability at the level of an armed attack—or even a use of armed force. 
Instead, it is simply a use of force, or maybe not even that. Cyber activities 
have the potential to offer a non-violent means to sanction a State for its 
internationally wrongful act as countermeasures.119 
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The Tallinn Manual addresses countermeasures in Rule 9, which states 
“[a] State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to propor-
tionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the re-
sponsible State.”120 A widely held view is that countermeasures cannot in-
volve the use of armed force.121 Countermeasures are exceptional in that 
they may justify otherwise unlawful conduct taken in response to a previ-
ous intentionally wrongful act of another State.122 In this respect, they are 
different than retorsion, which is a response by means of an “unfriendly act 
not amounting to a violation of international law, to either (a) a breach of 
international law or (b) an unfriendly act, by another State.”123 Retorsion 
can include breaking off diplomatic relations, discontinuing or withholding 
of trade, denying economic or financial benefits, etc.124 Importantly, acts of 
retorsion can involve cyber measures, such as occurred when Estonia 
“suspended some services to internet protocol (IP) addresses from Rus-
sia.”125 
The concept of countermeasures is a broad one with reference some-
times being “made to the application of a ‘sanction’ or to a ‘reaction’ to a 
prior internationally wrongful act; historically the more usual terminology 
was that of ‘legitimate reprisals’ or, more generally, measures of ‘self-
protection’ or ‘self-help.’”126 Countermeasures “are essentially temporary 
measures, taken to achieve a specified end, whose justification terminates 
once the end is achieved.”127 The wide range of permissible non-forcible 
actions is reflected, in part, in Article 41 of the UN Charter in its reference 
to “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including “complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tel-
egraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
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diplomatic relations.” This article specifically endorses economic coercion, 
although only when decided by the Security Council.128 That being said, 
these measures are reflective of the types of countermeasures and acts of 
retorsion that might be contemplated since they are viewed as not involv-
ing the use of armed force.  
The reference to measures involving economic coercion further high-
lights that rushing too quickly to include the disruption of commerce under 
the scope of a cyber armed attack may actually restrict policy and opera-
tional options available to technologically advanced States.  Those States 
must, however, be prepared to confront a more level cyber playing field 
with traditionally less capable States, which respond to advanced State ac-
tivities by interfering with their economies. Economically powerful States 
might, however, have a very low threshold of acceptance for such activity. 
The debate over cyber countermeasures may also cause a reconsidera-
tion of whether such measures can involve the use of force that falls below 
the level of armed attack. Judge Simma, in his separate opinion in the Oil 
Platforms case, concluded that countermeasures “[a]gainst such smaller scale 
use[s] of force, defensive action—by force also ‘short of’ Article 51—is to 
be regarded as lawful.”129 Such an approach garnered the support of other 
respected academics, although this view of the law has remained a minority 
one.130 However, it may be preferable to allow more limited cyber exchang-
es between potential antagonists than force the confrontation into the 
realm of self-defense and ultimately armed conflict. The challenge when 
using computer network operations as a countermeasure is to ensure that 
the response remains below the threshold of an armed attack. This requires 
an ability to identify and articulate where on the gravity scale such a cyber 
use of armed force will lie, which has proven difficult to identify.131 The 
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legal assessment of the gravity of an attack has not been made any easier by 
the terminology that is commonly employed with respect to such cyber 
activity. It is that issue to which the analysis will now turn. 
 
4. Terminology: The Impact of Words 
 
It may very well be that the dialogue of cyber is pushed into the force 
realm by the terminology that has been applied to describe cyber activity. 
The most obvious examples are the terms “computer network attack”132 
and “computer network defense.”133 However, it is also evident in the na-
tional cyber security policy of Canada, which extends the concept of cyber 
attack to unintentional access to and use of information.134 The use of the 
term “attack” invokes a perception of military activity, but in reality the 
cyber activity may simply involve limited manipulation of information.  
A downside of lawyers entering the cyber highway so late is that there 
has not been an opportunity to help select the terms used to describe cyber 
operations. While the operational, doctrinal and legal communities use the 
same words, those words do not always have the same meaning. The use of 
the warlike term “attack” for an exceptionally broad range of computer 
activity is fraught with the potential for misunderstanding and overreaction 
that can have significant consequences, particularly at a strategic level. A 
political leader or media outlet may rightly claim, from a doctrinal perspec-
tive, that a “computer network attack” has taken place when another State 
is alleged to have hacked into the data-storage system and stolen sensitive 
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information relating to a defense procurement project.135 That statement 
could create the perception that there was an act of force inflicted by one 
State on another, when the “attack” simply involved the destruction of in-
formation on a computer or was conducted as a step precedent to an act of 
espionage.  The real challenge for many States is that they are themselves 
engaged in the same activity.136 Calling such activity an attack could make it 
easier for other States to characterize what is, in effect, espionage as illegit-
imate. This could be exceptionally counterproductive for the State subject-
ed to the espionage when the issue is assessed from a broader strategic per-
spective.137 
The gap in meaning between a computer network attack and even the 
low threshold of a use of force under the jus ad bellum highlights the risks 
inherent in not adopting a commonly acceptable language to describe activ-
ities in the cyber domain. Significantly, the use of terms like attack also po-
tentially limits non-forceful responses, since even the most basic penetra-
tion of a computer network appears to engage some aspect of computer 
network attack. For example, a State may be reluctant to use cyber means 
to respond to incidents out of concern relatively minor cyber activity can 
be mischaracterized as a more aggressive action potentially justifying a ki-
netic response by the aggrieved State. 
There is terminology from the criminal sphere, such as “illegal access,” 
“illegal interception,” “data interference,” “misuse of devices,” “computer 
related forgery” and “computer related fraud” found in the Council of Eu-
rope’s Convention on Cybercrime that may more clearly define most cyber 
activity and provide less opportunity for misunderstanding and confu-
sion.138 It is noteworthy that the use of terms such as attack was avoided in 
the convention, although attacks are referred to in its accompanying ex-
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planatory report.139 What is not clear is how easy it would be at this stage to 
alter the attack terminology that may have become entrenched in national 
security doctrine. But the use of terms focused on criminal activity, when 
that in fact is what is being described in such doctrine, would help avoid 
confusion and misunderstanding regarding the nature of the cyber threat 
from a national defense perspective. 
In many respects, terminology in the non-legal world has shown itself 
to be more subject to change than its legal counterpart. Perhaps one of the 
best examples of the fluidity of terminology can be found in the efforts to 
describe guerrilla warfare. In this regard, a myriad of terms have been ap-
plied to such conflicts, including “small wars,”140 “imperial policing,”141 
“police action,”142 “insurgency,” 143 low intensity conflict,”144 “military oper-
ations other than war,”145 “peacekeeping,”146 “peace enforcement,”147 three 
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block war,”148 “revolutionary warfare,”149 “irregular warfare,”150 “war 
amongst the people,”151 “mosaic war”152 and “hybrid warfare.”153 One of 
the strengths of the legal approach, although also a potential weakness in 
terms of addressing new technology, has been its more consistent use of 
terminology. State legal advisors would likely have to present a convincing 
argument that terminology has to be changed. In this regard, they may be 
assisted if non-lawyers pause to think of the operational flexibility at the 
strategic level that the use of less warlike terms can offer. 
 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
It is evident the cyber domain presents significant new challenges for inter-
preters of the jus ad bellum. A key issue to be addressed is the willingness of 
the international legal community to accept change to long-standing inter-
pretations of the use of force under that body of law. For those lawyers 
who work for government, human rights advocates and academics, serious 
questions need to be asked—and answered—as to whether there is a need 
to create a whole new terminology and new principles regarding the use of 
cyber. This will present a daunting challenge for some parts of the interna-
tional legal community who, even now, more than a decade after 9/11, ei-
ther do not recognize154 or only give grudging acceptance to the Security 
Council’s determination that the right of self-defense under Article 51 can 
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be exercised against non-State actors who are not associated with a State.155 
As an initial foray into assessing cyber warfare in this context, the Tallinn 
Manual does not indicate that the necessary consensus will be easily reached 
on such a foundational issue. After reviewing what it describes as a contro-
versial topic, it states “[s]uch State practice appears to signal a willingness of 
States to apply the right of self-defense to attacks conducted by non-State 
actors.”156 There is a very real danger that advances in technology are out-
stripping the pace of the legal dialogue. 
It can only be hoped that more success is attained in clarifying the law 
surrounding the cyber domain than appears to have been the case with di-
rect participation in hostilities. More than a decade after targeted killings 
attracted the attention of the international legal community, there still ap-
pears to be a lack of consensus on who qualifies as a lawful target. This is 
the case with regard to the question of whether members of organized 
armed groups can be targeted by virtue of their membership and, if so, 
how such membership is determined.157 It was also noted in 2012 that 
“there is a range of views among the United States and its partners on the 
precise ‘test’ that should be applied to determine membership.”158 This is 
an area where the responsibility rests primarily with States, however, the 
State approach to defining that term still appears to be shrouded in a fog of 
ambiguity.  
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general approach to DPH, the ICRC is correct to focus on function (the kind of act) ra-
ther than status (combatant vs. unprivileged belligerent) [of organized armed groups], but 
the creation of CCF [continuous combat function] category is, de facto, a status determina-
tion that is questionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation to 
‘for such time’ as opposed to ‘all the time.’”). 
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The fact that DPH is also an important issue for cyber warfare com-
pounds the challenge facing those seeking to provide legal certainty to per-
sons tasked with the responsible application of cyber force. Ambiguity as 
to how the law applies to cyber warfare has a positive aspect in that it pro-
vides operational space as a legal and policy consensus is being developed, 
while still acknowledging the requirement to operate within a legal enve-
lope. However, the lack of certainty also potentially undermines the estab-
lishment of clear accountability “red lines.” It can also have an adverse im-
pact on the ability to control the actions of States, which, of course, is the 
very reason that the modern jus ad bellum and jus in bello were developed 
during the twentieth century.  
If all of this is a challenge for government lawyers it may a greater one 
for those working for human rights advocacy groups. Certainly, there are 
options for human rights advocates to become cyber literate through ac-
cess to academia and by hiring retired experts. They will also have to un-
dergo a paradigm shift in their thinking, including expanding their horizons 
beyond the laws in war to the laws governing the recourse to war. Perhaps 
one of the most interesting aspects of cyber is that it has breathed life into 
the jus ad bellum discipline, which had fallen somewhat into the background 
of legal discussion given the predominance of non-international armed 
conflict in the post-Cold War era.159  
States are testing the boundaries, not only of the technical applications 
of cyber, but also societal tolerance for its use or abuse. This presents a 
challenge for technical, operational and legal personnel interested in regu-
lating its use. The information superhighway is becoming increasingly 
crowded with participants who are being forced to slow down, yield or 
perhaps even stop some activities.  The intervention of lawyers will not 
always be seen as a positive development.160 While cyber warfare develop-
ers and operators are being required to expose their inventions and capabil-
ities, lawyers are finding themselves having to use nearly seventy-year-old 
law developed for different circumstances to deal with new technology. For 
those lawyers both inside and outside of government whose comfort zone 
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is “old rules” and “old conflicts,” this will be a challenging time as they 
grapple with new technology and new warfare.  
For lawyers embarked on this path to deal with the mankind’s latest 
technological advancement, there is some hope that can be taken from his-
tory regarding their ultimate success in establishing a legal framework to 
govern its operations. Take an example from the jus in bello context, such as 
aerial warfare, where the law of armed conflict has been applied to new 
technology, in this case operating in “the third dimension.”161 The intro-
duction of air warfare during the twentieth century presented a significant 
and daunting challenge to the legal community in its efforts to regulate its 
application during armed conflict. As was evident in the post-World War I 
debate over airpower, reaching consensus on regulation was difficult, as 
there were two “opposite tendencies . . . the ideology of extreme pacifists, 
well intentioned, good but utterly utopian and the thinking of hard and 
shrewd people . . . who wanted to keep their hands free as to the conduct 
of the next war.”162 Not only were initial efforts at regulating airpower 
through the development of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare large-
ly unsuccessful,163 one view in 1950 was that the use of airpower during 
World War II had reduced the principle of distinction to a hollow phrase: 
“in the matter of aerial bombardment there is no rule firmly grounded in 
the past on which we can place reliance—for aerial bombardment is a new 
weapon which raises new problems.”164  
It took the concern over wide-scale bombing in World War II, as well 
as the concerted attention of the human rights community in the 1960s and 
1970s, for convention based legal rules for precautions governing targeting 
to be developed in Additional Protocol I.165 These rules are now accepted 
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as customary international law.166 Renewed interest in aerial warfare has 
resulted in the development of the 2009 Manual on International Law Applica-
ble to Air and Missile Warfare.167 By the end of the first decade of the twenty-
first century, the United States, as the preeminent world military power, is 
committed to these legal precautions. This is evidenced by the statements 
of senior government officials regarding targeting during counterterrorism 
operations.168  
Given the pace of technological advances, however, it is clear that the 
regulation of the cyber domain in either a jus ad bellum or jus in bello context 
cannot be allowed to follow the same difficult and tortoise like path to reg-
ulation of air warfare as occurred last century. There are signs that this will 
occur, although it is always necessary to remember that verbal statements 
to follow fundamental humanitarian law principles regarding aerial warfare 
were also expressed immediately prior to World War II.169  There has al-
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ready been a commitment by the United States regarding the application of 
not only the jus ad bellum, but also the law of armed conflict to cyber opera-
tions conducted during armed conflict.170 What is not known at this stage is 
what adherence to broad legal principles means in practical terms during 
cyber operations or how it will be interpreted in responding to cyber at-
tacks. It is here that the operationalization of international law in the cyber 
domain by all States will fully demonstrate that commitment. Until the 
technical, policy and legal communities merge on the cyber highway and 
“rules of the road” are not only agreed to, but acted upon, it may be the 
principle of reciprocity that keeps cyber within the lanes as the law catches 
up to the latest means of warfare that the human mind has developed.171  
Finally, in assessing the impact of international law on the cyber do-
main, what cannot be forgotten is that the threshold for armed attack pro-
vides, in practical terms, the setting of a threshold for war. As has been 
noted by David Rodin, wars are hugely complex events, impacted by un-
predictable eventualities and which “have a peculiar internal dynamic of 
their own which often subverts the original objectives and commitments of 
those who initiate them.”172 Caution will have to be applied in considering 
the threshold for cyber-based armed attacks given the considerable human-
itarian, financial and reputational costs armed conflict inevitably entails. 
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